In Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas traces the logic of his argument by developing God’s character and nature through a philosophical weaving of the human experience. This essay will examine Aquinas’ “The General Notion of Good” and “God’s Goodness.” For example, he begins by arguing how the general notion of good relates to the human experience, then follows by pointing all that is good is from the nature of God. I will briefly examine each chapter, then conclude with a word about Aquinas’ logic.
The General Notion of Good
In “The General Notion of Good,” Thomas examines whether “good” is the same as “being,” and the order for which the “Good” and “being” belong. Quoting Boethius, Aquinas starts with countering the misconception which insists, “’I observe that it is one thing for things to be good, another for them to exist.’”[1] Essentially, while goodness and being may “differ only conceptually,”[2] Aquinas argues, saying, “The goodness of something consists in its being desirable… But desirability evidently follows upon perfection, for things always desire their perfection. And the perfection of a thing depends on the extent to which it has achieved actuality.”[3] Therefore, it is “by existing that everything achieves actuality. So, good clearly does not differ from being, though the word ‘good’ expresses a notion of desirability not expressed by the word ‘being.’”[4] Because “’Being’ signifies actuality… which is related to potentiality,”[5] it is not the exact same as good. And “But ‘good’ signifies perfection or desirability and, therefore, finality.”[6] He states that we use these without qualification, conveying, “For something is a being without qualification because of its first actuality, and it is good without qualification because of its final actuality.”[7] However, because “We call something good when it receives a form,”[8] Aquinas may insist that “’existing is the first created thing,’”[9] and “the most basic idea we meet within intellectual conceptualism is that of being,”[10] Aquinas may contend that being is more fundamental than goodness.[11] To give example, he relates that the desire to remove evil “is a lack of some sort of existence.”[12]Therefore, the desire for good must come from an abundance of some sort of existence. Being actually exists, thereby, being is more fundamental than goodness.
Aquinas then argues that because “every being other than God is created by God… And God himself is supremely good. So, every being is good.”[13] Furthermore, “Good, however, does not add to being in this way. It merely adds the notion of desirability and perfection associated with the very existence of things… Being good, then, does not limit being.”[14] This leads him to argue, “goodness, involves being an end or goal… Since goodness is what all things desire, and since this involves the idea of a goal, being good clearly involves being a goal.”[15] He defends this, conveying, “First, there occurs a form itself, which gives something existence; then there occurs the thing’s operative power through which it comes to perfection of existence; and finally the characteristic of goodness comes about, on which what has been perfected in the being is based.”[16] Which insist, “So, good people are not those with good intellects but those with a good will. But the will’s special function is the pursuit of ends. So, to say that ‘we exist is because God is good’ is to refer to final causality.”[17] And finally, Aquinas argues that goodness has a species, mode, and order, writing:
“Augustine says that ‘these three – mode, species, and order – are goods always found in everything that God makes; where these three are great, there are great goods; where they are of small account, things are of little good; where they are totally absent there is no good.’ Now, none of this would be so unless goodness consisted in these three things. So, goodness, consists in mode, species, and order.”[18]
Quoting Augustine, Aquinas says, “’form determines the species of things…’ Finally, form issues in an inclination to some end or action or the like, for activity follows upon actuality… And this is expressed by ‘weight’ and ‘order.’”[19]Because goodness has a mode, species, and order, “The primary sense of ‘good’ is ‘worthy’, the second ‘delightful’, and the third ‘useful.’”[20] There, humans are good to the extent that their creation has a causality of being which is supremely good.
God’s Goodness
Haters would imply that humanity cannot associate with the goodness of God based on mode, species, and order; since God is immeasurable.[21] To this, Aquinas first argues the shareable nature of God’s goodness. Humans may associate with God’s goodness because He is the efficient cause of all things, and it is in God’s nature to share his goodness.[22] Furthermore, mode, species and order belong to the essence of caused good. But the goodness belongs to God as a cause, so he imposes mode, species and order on others. These three are in God as their cause.”[23] He then defends God’s supreme goodness, conveying, “Augustine tells us that the three divine persons ‘are the supreme good seen by the supremely clean of heart.’”[24] God,
“as being the first source of every perfection that things desire. And these perfections as I have shown, flow from God, not as from an efficient cause in the same genus as its effects, but as from an efficient cause that does not agree with its effects either in species or in genus. Now, an agent in the same genus as its effects mirrors them with unchanged form, but an agent not in the same genus as its effects mirrors them more perfectly… So, since God is (not himself in a genus) is good as the first source of everything, he must be good in the most perfect manner possible, and we call him supremely good for this reason.”[25]
The key proponent here is that the desire for goodness does not mean that everyone seeks everything which is good; and “’no one is good but God alone’ refers to essential goodness.”[26] Therefore, God is essentially good because, as “Boethius says that everything other than God participates in goodness.”[27] And,
“there is a threefold perfection in things: first, they are established in existence; second, they possess in addition certain accidents necessary to perfect their activity; and a third perfection comes when they attain some extrinsic goal… Now, this threefold perfection belongs essentially to no caused thing, but only to God; for only in him is essence the same as existence, and in him there are no added accidents. And he is not disposed towards some extrinsic goal but is himself the ultimate goal of all other things.”[28]
While God is the supreme goodness, “existence is not the essence of any created thing. So, it does not follow that created things are essentially good.”[29] As stated, only God is the source of and the supreme goodness, and all other created things must participate in his goodness to mirror his goodness, though it be deficient.[30] Aquinas does insert from Plato that separate things may name their own goodness,[31] however, to participate in the supreme goodness is to participate in God. Concluding, “In this sense we say that all things are good by God’s goodness, which is the pattern, source, and the goal of all goodness. Nevertheless, the resemblance to God’s goodness that leads us to call something good is inherent in the thing itself, belonging to it as a form and, therefore, naming it. So, there is one goodness in all things, and yet many.”[32]
Conclusion
Through the example of ‘good’ and ‘being,’ one may see that Aquinas traces his logic by relating God’s essence and supreme goodness as the source or cause of all goodness and created beings. He does so, starting with philosophical foundations relatable to the human experience. Aquinas urges through human logic, before demonstrating God’s infinite truth. This is effective because by appealing to the human logic he settles much of the argument on human terms which are relatable to the human experience. Finite human experience may identify with the truth Aquinas lays down when they are better prepared through the finite, unto the infinite. While some may appeal that Aquinas’ logic seems backwards, the logic stems from making the finite ready for the infinite. Thereby, when the finite stomach the appropriate order, which is being and then goodness; being is more fundamental than goodness. Then the finite may look upon the being of God as the source of infinite goodness. And if God is supremely good, then those who depend on his goodness for life participate in an infinite goodness beyond what may be perceived by those separate from God.
[1]Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Brian Davies & Brian Leftow. Summa Theologiae: Questions on God. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. P. 51. Print.
[2]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 52.
[3]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 52.
[4]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 52.
[5]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 52.
[6]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 52.
[7]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 53. “For to exist without qualification is to achieve an initial actuality, and to be good without qualification is to achieve complete actuality” (Ibid. Aquinas. P. 53).
[8]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 53.
[9]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 54.
[10]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 54.
[11]“Being, on the other hand, is related only to a formal cause, whether intrinsic or exemplary. And this causality extends only to actual things” (Ibid., Aquinas. P. 55).
[12]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 55.
[13]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 56.
[14]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 56.
[15]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 57.
[16]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 58.
[17]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 58.
[18]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 59.
[19]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 60.
[20]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 62.
[21]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 63.
[22]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 63. Aquinas elaborates, writing, “So an efficient cause is desirable and may be called good because what is desired from it is that the effect share its goodness by resembling it. Clearly then, since God is the first efficient cause of everything, goodness and desirability belong to him” (Ibid., Aquinas. P. 63, 64).
[23]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 64.
[24]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 65.
[25]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 65.
[26]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 65.
[27]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 66.
[28]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 66, 67.
[29]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 67.
[30]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 68.
[31]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 67, 68.
[32]Ibid., Aquinas. P. 68.